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Abstract 
We test how informed investors with local expertise can affect cross-border deal success 
using a comprehensive dataset of corporate acquirers’ share registers. We posit that deals in 
which long-term investors have a high level of expertise in the target firm’s region are more 
likely to perform better than if the deal is ‘naked’, i.e. when such regional expertise amongst 
the investors is low. We show that the strength of this effect depends upon an index of 
country-level M&A maturity which measures the relative divergence between acquirer and 
target countries. Specifically, we investigate whether acquirers investing in countries with 
low M&A maturity gain greater benefit from investors with regional expertise. We present 
evidence which confirms the hypothesis that acquirers in cross-border corporate transactions 
are more likely to be successful if the acquirer’s investors have a higher level of expertise in 
the target region, and that this effect is strongest when the maturity for corporate transactions 
of the target country is low. This provides a specific setting which is consistent with earlier 
theoretical work that argues in general that information flows should not just be from firms to 
capital markets but also in the opposite direction, and that this flow of information is 
particularly important whenever information is dispersed. 
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Naked M&A transactions: How the lack of local expertise in cross-
border deals can negatively affect acquirer performance – and how 




Ferreira, Massa and Matos (2009), hereafter FMM, consider cross-border M&A deals and 
find (Subsection 4.3) that the extent to which a deal is value-increasing depends on whether 
there is foreign institutional ownership of the companies. Specifically, they find (p. 640) that 
“foreign institutional ownership in both target and acquirer firms is associated with higher 
combined returns in cross-border deals. This is consistent with the “facilitation hypothesis” 
that foreign institutions promote deals that offer greater value creation (synergy).” They 
argue that this is because foreign institutional investors may reduce transaction costs and 
informational asymmetries between potential acquirers and targets. However, they do not 
propose in detail how these advantages arise. 
 
Building upon the theory of Financial Geography and the work of Dye and Sridhar (2003), 
we argue that the reason that the holdings of foreign institutional investors is positively 
associated with the performance of acquirer returns is because a subset of the investors may 
hold key expertise in the target region. That is, in an economic setting in which information is 
hard to gather and diverse in nature, it may be reasonably argued that those investors with 
regional expertise hold information which the management of the acquirer finds hard to 
collect. Thus, they may have a role to play in reducing cross-border M&A deal informational 
asymmetries. To summarise, one goal of this research is to refine the earlier hypotheses of 
FMM in order to provide a more nuanced understanding of the specific reasons behind the 




In order to try to detect these effects, we conduct this research at acquirer share register level 
and measure the success of transactions at deal level. Additionally, since we argue here that 
the effects are most likely to arise with those institutional investors who are both knowledge-
intensive and who have regional expertise, the investor sample is further refined. First, we 
split institutional investors into those who are relatively more knowledge-intensive 
(informed) versus those who are not. The latter group includes those who only invest in 
specific stocks for very short periods of time and, therefore, are not assumed to conduct 
detailed firm-level analyses. Second, in order to identify informed institutional investors, we 
conduct an analysis of the company share registers which they invest in to ascertain their 
portfolio allocation, which we then use as a proxy for measuring regional expertise. We, 
therefore, suggest that simply looking at aggregate institutional investor holdings is an 
imperfect measure of the potential for reductions in informational asymmetries by acquirer 
firms learning from institutional investors. Instead, we test to see whether the holding 
positions in the target region of informed institutional investors is positively associated with 
post-M&A deal performance. Our statistically significant results confirm the above thesis.  
 
In addition, we posit that this two-way communication is of particular importance when the 
acquiring firm is investing in a country where the maturity for corporate investment purpose 
is low, which we relate to the relatively higher information asymmetry in these situations. 
Thus, we suggest that the relationship established by FMM between the composite of 
investors on the share register and deal success is due to a reduction in information 
asymmetry. This effect is most marked when the investment is being made in countries with 
less developed M&A markets. Our conclusions add to the existing literature by highlighting 
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the importance of maintaining in general terms a constructive dialogue with long-term and 
strategically-savvy investors about M&A programmes and strategies. 
 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 is a review of the literature on financial 
geography, the choices open to management of strategic options contingent on market 
reaction and other related literature which can be used to provide support for our 
aforementioned primary hypothesis; Section 3 discusses the data sources, provides a 
description of the data and a full list of variables; Section 4 presents empirical tests of the 
hypotheses and robustness tests; and the conclusion is presented in Section 5. 
 
2. Related literature 
 
This section considers the previous literature on the benefits which can accrue to the 
management of an acquirer by consulting its investors when it is considering making a cross-
border M&A deal. With regard to this, it has long been recognised (see, for instance, 
Jennings and Mazzeo, 1991) that when an initial M&A bid is issued, the management of the 
potential acquirer needs to be cognisant of the stock market reaction to the initial 
announcement. For instance, shortly after Hewlett Packard (HP) withdrew from a much 
touted potential deal with PwC, HP’s CEO, Carly Fiorina, stated, “I recognise that a number 
of you verbalised your concerns over the past few weeks, and others simply voted with their 
positions in the stock. ... I realise you made some valid points.”1 
 
Expressed more generally, Dye and Sridhar (p.389, 2003) argue that “The existing literature 
… primarily views the information flows between firms and the capital market as one way - 
                                                          
1Recorded on numerous press wires at the time, including Canada’s Financial Post (National Post) on 14 
November 2000, ‘Hewlett shelves P→C deal’ by David Akin with files from Simon Avery. 
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from firms to the capital market. This paper is premised on information flows also occurring 
from capital markets to firms…” In their model, investors form an opinion on the potential 
(net cash flow) prospects associated with an option to invest in a project, here interpreted as 
an M&A deal. Furthermore, they argue that information about the potential success of the 
new deal project is widely dispersed and it is reasonable to assume that the management of 
the acquirer will want to have access to some of the information held by others before making 
a decision on whether or not to invest. Hence, the only way that management can access 
information on the value of a new project is by observing the reaction of investors - in terms 
of aggregate price - when it is announced that the potential deal is ‘live’. Just as in the real 
case of HP above, management can choose to back out of the deal if the price reaction is 
sufficiently negative.  
 
However, we note that there may be other ways in which the management of the acquirer can 
learn from investors. For example, the senior management of firms meet their major 
institutional investors on a regular basis and talk in general terms about strategy. Holland 
(2006), for instance, discusses how senior management and institutional investors exchange 
information while staying within the spirit of disclosure regulations such as Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (Reg FD) in the US or the equivalent in other locations. It is, for instance, not 
illegal for senior management to ask institutional investors what factors, in their view, 
determined the success or failure of deals in which they had a position. In addition, they can 
talk about the general economic performance of and ease of doing business in certain foreign 
countries and, in general terms, the desirability of foreign acquisitions in order to, for 
instance, get an early toe hold in an emerging economy without naming any specific targets. 
Management can use such carefully conducted meetings in order to collect information and, 
in principle, learn from knowledgeable institutional investors. For example, before a UK 
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company considers any specific acquisitions in Brazil, it could be helpful to hear from 
informed institutional investors what socio-political and regulatory constraints previous UK-
Brazil deals had encountered. If that company is in the oil sector and considering an 
acquisition in Brazil, it could be instructive to hear what role the Brazilian government took 
in regulating the oil industry and what special role the mixed state-private organisation of 
Petrobras plays in influencing the competitiveness of the oil sector. The potential for such 
learning when cross-border deals are being considered is the principal focus of this research. 
 
Dye and Sridhar assume that information is widely dispersed, so management find it hard to 
collect it all themselves. Given the collection problems, management may choose to consult 
investors who hold information which is difficult to come by. Rather than simply asserting 
that such dispersion exists, we consider the institutional reasons for its existence in certain 
settings and not in others. The principal reason which we propose here for the existence of 
dispersion is based on the notion of country-level relative diversity in M&A maturity. That is, 
we suggest that dispersion may be relatively low in cross-border deals between similarly 
mature M&A markets (e.g., US to UK), whereas when there is divergence in maturity (e.g., 
US to India), there may be high dispersion of information. To summarise, we assume that the 
potential value to management of informed investors is greatest when the M&A maturity in 
the target region is low. In order to provide support for the assumption that informed 
investors are likely to hold valuable dispersed information and to explain how to identify 
such investors, it is necessary to review the literature on financial geography briefly. 
 
The earlier research in this area concentrated on how certain investors try to build up 
proprietary ‘local’ information expertise. For instance, Huberman (2001) looks at regional 
Bell-operated companies and shows that investors tended to prefer to invest in local Bell 
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firms rather than those in other regions and, in a similar fashion, Coval and Moskowitz 
(2001) find that US institutional investors exhibit a strong preference for locally 
headquartered firms in their domestic portfolios. More recently, Uysal et al. (2008) examine 
the impact of geographical proximity on the acquisition decisions of US companies and find 
that “acquirer returns in local transactions were more than twice that in non-local 
transactions.” Bae et al. (2008) suggest that local analysts have a significant informational 
advantage over foreign analysts, basing this conclusion on data collected from a large sample 
of countries. They argue that a plausible explanation for their ability to identify a local 
advantage “is that local analysts have better access to information because they can talk to 
firm representatives in person and observe what goes on in firms directly.” Thus, their 
research suggests that some institutional investors may be characterised as collecting and 
processing local information which is difficult or costly to access. This then begs the question 
of how to identify institutional investors who develop local expertise. 
 
In an attempt to answer this question, Chen, Harford and Li (2007) argue that it is a mistake 
to view all institutional investors as having common information sets and processing ability.  
They argue that all institutional investors “face a cost-benefit analysis of monitoring versus 
trading, where monitoring includes both information gathering and efforts to influence 
management. Monitoring is distinguished from trading by both the type of information 
gathered (long-term versus short-term) and the effort to influence management rather than to 
simply trade on that information.” They define a class of institutional investors which they 
describe as specialist monitors who invest significant resources in understanding the complex 
business environment of the firms in which they invest. They argue that those investors are 
characterised as conducting ‘deep research’ and, furthermore, that they typically invest for 
the long term. In addition, they posit that such investors can be identified by looking at 
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portfolio turnover styles. Thus, we identify the informed investors most likely to collect local 
(regional) information as those investors who have a low portfolio turnover style. 
 
To summarise the above, the literature on financial geography suggests that investors may 
earn higher returns if they collect complex local information. Dye and Sridhar’s work 
suggests that this is exactly the sort of information which management may need to access 
when it is making investment decisions with dispersed information. We suggest that a 
specific application of these generic issues arises in the field of cross-border M&A deals. 
When the relative maturity of the M&A market of the potential target is significantly lower 
than that of the potential acquirer, the management of the acquirer may not have sufficient 
information on the target region, so, in order to increase the chance of a successful deal, it 
will want to collect information which is held in diverse places. In such a setting, informed 
investors with regional expertise may have a role to play in releasing difficult-to-collect 
dispersed information. This leads to our two primary hypotheses: 
 
H1: The Positive Effect of Regionally-Informed Investors on Deal Performance 
Medium- to long-term post-M&A performance is positively related to the level of expertise 
that the acquirer’s investors possess in the target region. 
 
H2: The Effect of Market Diversity on the Importance of Regionally-Informed 
Investors 
The effect of regionally-informed investors on post-M&A performance depends on the 




In order to test the relative success of various cross-regional deals, we adopt the standard 
approach of using medium- to long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns following the 
announcement of an M&A deal. Thus, we estimate the following equation for acquirer ex-
post performance: 
 
BHAR_Reti,j =  H1  KnI_II i, jH2  KnI_II i, jRel_MaturityAcq.-Tar. j
k *(Control variables) + i, j        (1) 
where: 
BHAR_Reti,j = the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) which accrue to acquirers’ low 
and very low turnover shareholder i from deal j over a 13-month event window starting from 
one month prior to announcement, to capture the run-up period, and ending 12 months after 
the announcement. 
KnI_II i, j = the percentage of the total portfolio of the low and very low turnover shareholder 
i, holding shares in the acquirer of deal j, which is invested in the region of the target company 
for deal j. 
Rel_MaturityAcq.-Tar j = the difference in M&A maturity between the acquirer and target 
countries for deal j. 
 
To summarise, in order to confirm the hypotheses, the empirical tests need to show that the 
data is consistent with 
H1 > 0 and 
H2 > 0 
 
We use the following standard control variables which are found to be relevant to post-




Acquirer borrowing capacity: Bruner (1988) shows that when bidders with high 
levels of debt capacity and liquidity buy targets with the opposite characteristics, this results 
in positive combined (acquirer and target) returns. We use the ratio of total debt to total assets 
of the bidder in order to estimate the debt capacity of bidder companies. We expect that the 
coefficient corresponding to this variable will be negative and significant. The results 
presented in Table 6 (models 1 and 2) demonstrate that this variable is negatively and 
significantly related to the post-merger performance of the bidder. 
 
Deal hostility: Mitchell and Stafford (2000), Cosh and Guest (2001), Fuller, Netter 
and Stegemoller (2002) and Megginson, Morgan and Nail (2004) document that hostile 
bidders tend to outperform non-hostile acquirers. We account for this effect by including a 
dummy variable which is equal to one in the cases of hostile takeovers. Interestingly, the 
results presented in Table 6 (all models) show that this variable has a negative and significant 
effect on post-M&A performance. 
Growth versus value bidders: So-called ‘glamour’ acquirers, i.e. companies with 
high market-to-book ratios, are more likely to overestimate their ability to perform a 
successful M&A deal as compared to value acquirers, i.e. companies with low market-to-
book ratios. We expect the block shareholders, CEOs and directors of value bidders to be 
more prudent. As a result, the market should view value bidders more favourably than 
glamour bidders. This hypothesis is supported by Rau and Vermaelen (1998). In addition, 
Devos, Kadapakkam and Krishnamurthy (2008), as well as Bouwman, Fuller and Nain 
(2009), show that bidders with low market-to-book ratios tend to perform better than glamour 
acquirers. We expect that there is a negative association between the acquirer market-to-book 
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ratio and post-M&A performance, and the results presented in Table 6 (all models) confirm 
our expectation.  
Industry relatedness: Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) and Martynova and 
Renneboog (2006) document that a high level of industry relatedness between the target and 
bidder can positively affect the post-M&A performance of bidders and vice versa. We use a 
dummy variable which captures the four-digit SIC (Standard Industry Classification) code 
relatedness between the target and bidder companies. In accordance with previous studies on 
post-deal performance and our a priori expectation, the four-digit SIC relatedness variable 
has a positive and significant coefficient (see Table 6, all models). 
 
Method of payment: Managers who view their companies as undervalued by the 
capital market prefer to finance acquisitions with cash, whereas those who view their 
company as overvalued are more likely to finance M&A deals with stock (Kang and Stulz, 
1997). Previous studies show that cash-financed acquisitions tend to be more beneficial, or at 
least less harmful, to bidder companies’ shareholders (e.g., Huang and →alkling, 1987; 
Travlos, 1987; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; and Carow, Heron and Saxton, 2004). We account 
for the latter effect by including a dummy variable which equals one when the method of 
payment for the acquisition is all cash and zero otherwise. In line with our a priori 
expectation, this variable has a positive and significant coefficient in Table 6 (all models). 
 
Acquirer liquidity: According Martynova and Renneboog (2006), acquirers 
characterised by high liquidity levels experience worse post-M&A performance. We use the 
ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets in order to capture the influence of this 
variable. We expect that the level of acquirer liquidity will exert a negative and significant 
impact on post-deal performance in our model. In line with previous studies and our a priori 
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expectation, the regression results presented in Table 6 (all models) show that the level of 
acquirer liquidity is negatively and significantly related to post-acquisition performance. 
 
Acquirer share turnover: We expect that when the degree of information 
asymmetry between the bidder company’s management and its shareholders is higher, the 
long-term post-M&A performance of bidders will be poorer. Following Ferreira et al. (2009), 
we account for this effect by measuring the share turnover of bidders prior to the 
announcement of a deal. We expect this variable to be positively and significantly associated 
with our measure of post-M&A performance. The results presented in Table 6 (models 2, 3 
and 4) show that acquirer share turnover has a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient. 
 
Difference between acquirer and target countries’ corporate governance: 
Martynova and Renneboog (2009) developed the so-called ‘positive spill-over by law’ 
hypothesis, which posits that the corporate governance regulations of the bidder are imposed 
on the target in M&A deals in which the acquirer is domiciled in a country with strong 
shareholder protection. Danbolt and Maciver (2012) provide empirical evidence in support of 
the positive spill-over by law hypothesis by demonstrating that the acquisition gains that 
accrue to target companies are significantly larger in cases when the acquirer’s country of 
domicile is characterised by a superior governance system. This can have a positive impact 
on the post-M&A returns which accrue to bidder companies.  To account for the latter effect, 
we calculate the difference between the acquirer and target countries’ anti-self-dealing 
indices. We expect this variable to have a positive and significant association with post-M&A 
bidder performance and that the higher the divergence between target and bidder shareholder 
protection, the more likely it is that synergies will be realised by strengthening the target 
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company’s corporate governance. According to the results presented in Table 6 (models 1, 2 
and 3), this variable has a positive and significant coefficient. 
 
Cultural difference between acquirer and target countries: We expect that 
acquirers can experience relatively poorer post M&A performance in cases when the cultural 
gap between the acquirer and target countries is relatively higher. This effect arises from 
difficulties in performing post-merger integration successfully when the cultural divergence 
makes integration a time consuming, difficult, and expensive process. In line with the results 
documented by Conn, Cosh, Guest and Hughes (2005), we provide empirical evidence in 
favour of this hypothesis (Table 6, models 3 and 4). 
 
We present all variables in Table 1. 
 
Place Table 1 here  
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
Following the approach of FMM, we merge a sample of cross-border M&A deals from SDC 
Platinum with the FactSet Lionshares Global Ownership database in order to obtain firm-
level institutional ownership as of the quarter-end prior to deal announcement. In contrast to 
FMM, our sample consists of completed bids only as we are interested in testing the 
relationship between knowledge-intensive investors’ levels of regional expertise and ex-post 
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success – measured here as medium- to long-term shareholder wealth creation.2 Next, we 
record the Factset region for the deals.  Our final sample includes only public acquirers. 
 
The data capture period is 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2011, and the resulting sample 
breaks down as follows: 
 
1. Potential cross-border deals from SDC       8,254 
2. M&A deals from 1 in which the acquirer has a share register in Factset   4,688 
3. Completed deals in 2 with acquirer share price data from t-1 to t+12 months   3,932 
4. Completed deals in 3 with all information for regression analysis available   2,065 
5. Completed deals in 3 including primary index-listed acquirers    1,236 
6. Completed deals in 5 with all information for regression analysis available  748 
 
Table 2 records the sample descriptive statistics for the deal data. 
 
Place Table 2 here 
Table 2 shows a breakdown of the acquirer and deal characteristics for the final study sample 
and the acquirers which are excluded as they are not primary index-listed (see step 5 above). 
As expected, the final sample displays the characteristics of a mature company sample. 
Specifically, the sample firms are larger in terms of revenue (a median revenue of $7.046bn 
compared to $296m) and market value (a median revenue of $8.807bn compared to $486m), 
                                                          
2
 Following a review of the acquirers’ share registers of the initial data sample of 3,932 cross-border deals, we 
further refine the sample to include only deals by acquirers which make out the constituency of the primary 
stock market index [primary index-listed acquirers], e.g. including firms listed on the FTSE 100 and excluding 
firms listed on, for example, AIM. We introduce this filter to the dataset as the initial dataset of acquirers 
display some anomalies related to the type of investor on the share registers. For example, we find an unusually 
low proportion of index-tracking investors in smaller stocks and an unusually high proportion of value investors 
in the initial data cut. It should be noted that we have tested for any potential bias that could be introduced to our 
analysis by the imposition of the additional data filter. Please refer to the Robustness tests section of this paper 
for further details. 
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than the excluded sample. The firms in the final sample are also more profitable than the 
excluded, less mature firms, with the median return on equity for the former being 16% and 
the latter 11% in the year prior to the announcement of the deal. 
 
We present the cross-regional deal distribution using the full set of deals including primary 
index-listed acquirers (step 5 above) from acquirer region to target region in Table 3, Panels 
A and B. 
 
Place Table 3 (Panels A & B) here 
 
We present the descriptive statistics in three ways. Panel A shows a numerical count of the 
regional deals. The within region deals are recorded on the diagonal and all other entries 
represent cross-regional deals. It is not surprising to see that the largest number of cross-
regional deals is from Europe to North America, followed by North America to Europe. 
Interestingly, the next highest cross-regional deal counts are for Asia to Europe and Asia to 
North America. The sum of these two-cross border counts in which the acquirer is Asian is 
actually greater than the deal count for within the Asian region. 
 
One problem with this type of count is that some regions are much larger than others, so 
Panel B presents the same deal data but in proportionate terms to avoid the possibility of 
relative regional trends being masked by focusing on a simple numerical count. The 
proportions show some interesting features for the smaller regions. African acquirers 
complete 32% of all their deals with European targets compared to 14% within the region 
itself and only 11% with North America. In contrast, Latin American acquirers do 71% of all 
their deals with North American targets, only 18% are within region and the percentage with 
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European targets is negligible. The other region which shows a clear pattern is the petro-
dollar rich region of the Middle East where acquirers have 52% of targets in North America, 
26% in Asia and a surprisingly low proportion of European targets of 9%. 
 
While these first two panels help to develop an appreciation of regional M&A geography, 
they do not provide any information on our key proposed explanatory variable of investor 
expertise. The next step is to analyse the final sample of cross-border acquirers’ share 
registers in order to construct the regional expertise variable. We identify the knowledge-
intensive (informed) investor subset by selecting all of the institutional investors classified by 
FactSet as having a low or very low portfolio turnover.3 
 
We then record the regional investment pattern for this large sub-sample of investors. So, for 
instance, for illustrative purposes consider an acquirer based in Europe. Step 1 records all of 
the investors on the acquirer’s share register with a low or very low turnover investment 
style. Step 2 then records the cross-regional distribution of all the investments of each of 
these informed investors. Thus, when a US acquirer is considering a cross-regional M&A 
deal into Latin America, it is possible to identify how many of its institutional investors 
already have holdings in Latin America and how much larger that holding is – implying that a 
larger proportion indicates a higher level of expertise. Specifically, our measure of foreign 
expertise is the percentage of each investor’s portfolio (measured by market capitalisation) 
which is invested in the target region.  If the deal is US (acquirer region: North America) to 
Brazil (target region: Latin America), we look at all of the investors which are on the US 
                                                          
3
 FactSet classifies investors on the basis of their portfolio turnover style in five categories: very high, high, 
medium, low and very low. It also classifies an institution as low turnover if it has a two- to four-year holding 
period and its portfolio has an annual turnover of 25% to 50%. An institution is classified as very low turnover if 
it has a holding period of four years or longer and its portfolio has an annual turnover of less than 25%. Portfolio 




acquirer’s share register. For each investor, we have the data of their regional investment, i.e. 
the proportion of their portfolio which is invested in each global region (North America, 
Europe, Latin America, Asia, the Pacific and the Middle East). In this example, the foreign 
expertise for each investor would be the percentage of market value which is held in the Latin 
America region vs. the total for all regions. We use these target region holdings as the 
measure (proxy) for regional expertise given that it is unlikely that the investors will have 
invested in the target region without first conducting research and collecting data. In order to 
see the patterns of regional expertise, Panel C presents the average level of expertise on 
acquirers’ share registers, i.e. the average portfolio allocation which informed investors 
(‘Low’ and ‘Very Low’) hold in the target region. 
 
Place Table 3 (Panel C) here 
 
Panel C, Columns 1 to 7, show the average expertise per regional pair. As an example, we 
find that for African acquirers which invest in Europe, the average regional expertise on their 
share register is 34% compared to 30% for investing in North America.The final two columns 
present the average regional expertise measured ex-ante on acquirers’ share registers per 
acquirer region but irrespective of target region. If we compare the top two listed acquirer 
regions, Africa and Asia, we see that Asian acquirers have on average more regional 
expertise. Therefore, Asian acquirers should be in a better position to evaluate investment 
opportunities abroad as compared to African acquirers, providing that their management 
teams consult the knowledge-intensive investors on their share registers. Finally, the last 
column takes the same average irrespective of target region but excludes intra-regional 
transactions. From this table, we conclude that European and Asian acquirers appear to have 
the highest level of knowledge-intensive expertise on their share registers when making 
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cross-border deals. The average portfolio allocation in the target region for knowledge-
intensive investors on the acquirer share register for European acquirers is 35% with the 
corresponding allocation for Asian acquirers’ investors being 30%. However, these figures do 
not address the issue of the large flow of intra-regional cross-border transactions for which 
we assume the level of investor expertise is less relevant. The average knowledge-intensive 
regional expertise for cross-regional deals is presented in Column 9 of the same panel. Here 
we can see that it is instead Asian (32%), Latin American (31%) and Pacific (28%) acquirers 
which have the highest level of expertise in the target region represented on their share 
registers. 
 
In addition to the regional expertise of investors, the other explanatory variable, which we 
introduce as a proxy for market divergence, is the difference in the maturity for M&A 
purposes of the acquirer and target regions. We capture this by using the M&A Maturity 
Index developed by Appadu, Faelten, Moeller and Vitkova (2012). This index is based on a 
country scoring procedure which evaluates the factors that make a country attractive for and 
able to sustain M&A activity. More specifically, the M&A maturity index is based on five 
main groups of factors which have been identified by previous studies as the major drivers of 
M&A activity. These five factor groups are: 
 
 Regulatory and political factors (e.g., rule of law (see Rossi and Volpin, 2004) and 
corruption of officials (see Yartey, 2008)); 
 Economic and financial factors (e.g., GDP growth (see Berthelemy and Demurger, 
2000 and Liu, Shu and Sinclair, 2009) and stock market capitalisation and access to 
financing (see Yartey, 2008 and Saborowski, 2009)); 
19 
 
 Technological factors (e.g., high-technology export and innovation (see Porter, 
1993)); 
 Socio-economic factors (e.g., population and demographics (Appadu, Faelten, 
Moeller and Vitkova (2012)); and 
 Quality of infra-structure and assets (e.g. roads and railways, and the number of 
sizeable corporate assets (see, e.g., Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis, 2004; Quazi, 
2011; Mateev, 2009 and Anyanwu, 2012)). 
 
The M&A Maturity Index allocates a score of between 0% and 100% for each factor group to 
148 countries worldwide – where 100% indicates the highest degree of development for 
M&A purposes and 0% the lowest level – and produces an overall M&A maturity score as a 
weighted average of the five groups. The top and bottom 15 countries represented in our 
sample are shown in Table 4, Panels A and B. 
 
Place Table 4 (Panels A & B) here 
 
The country rankings for 2012 demonstrate the emergence of Asia as a fast developing region 
for M&A activity, with the region claiming five of the top ten country positions. Despite the 
US (85%) and the UK (82%) claiming the top and third spots respectively, Singapore (84%) 
and Hong Kong (81%) are second and fourth respectively, with South Korea (5th), China 
(9th) and Japan (10th) following. By using the relative M&A maturity index score,4 i.e. the 
difference between the acquirer and target countries’ levels of development for M&A 
purposes, we should be in a better position to measure the true divergence between the two 
markets and, therefore, better identify the cross-border transactions for which management is 
                                                          
4
 Note that the M&A Maturity Index is measured on a time series basis starting from the year 2006, before 
which we use data for 2006 as the latest available year. 
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in greater need of additional expertise. According to Tong, Alessandri, Reur and 
Chintakananda (2008), country- as opposed to industry-effects also influence the 
performance of companies involved in cross-country investment activities. 
 
In Table 5, Panels A to B we present a univariate analysis of acquirer ex-post shareholder 
wealth creation. 
 
Place Table 5 Panels A & B here 
 
The general form of equation (1) shows that we use post-acquisition returns as the dependent 
variable in order to appraise the performance of individual M&A deals. More specifically, 
since the main focus of our analysis is to examine post-M&A performance from the 
perspective of investors with low or very low turnover (informed investors), we argue here 
that the most relevant performance metric is the one which takes into account the post-
acquisition returns over a 13-month investment horizon.5 We thus measure performance on 
the basis of acquirer share price returns using the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) 
which accrue to acquirers over a 13-month event window starting from one month prior to 
the announcement of the deal in order to capture the run-up period to 12 months post the 
announcement of the deal.6 The BHAR approach to measuring abnormal returns has been 
widely used in studies involving share price performance (see, e.g., Barber and Lyon, 1997 
and Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). Mitchell and Stafford (2000) define BHAR as “the average 
multiyear return from a strategy of investing in all firms that complete an event and selling at 
the end of a pre-specified holding period versus a comparable strategy using otherwise 
                                                          
5
 This investment horizon also coincides with the time period which Factset uses in order to distinguish between 
different levels of investor turnover.  
6
 Note that the BHAR analysis uses the total returns of a company, i.e. it includes share price appreciation or 
depreciation as well as the return from reinvesting the paid dividends. 
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similar non-event firms.” An advantage of using BHAR is that this approach to measuring 
company share price performance is closer to investors’ actual investment experience 
compared to the periodic rebalancing which other approaches to share price performance 
analysis involve. Given the specific cross-regional focus of this study, the BHARs are equally 
weighted and adjusted to the performance of the respective MSCI regional index of the 
acquirer company over the same period. Specifically, we consider the following regions for the 
purposes of calculating bidder BHAR: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, 
North America and the Pacific.7 
 
In Table 5, Panel A, we provide an overview of acquirers’ BHAR across acquirer region and 
time. Our first conclusion is that, on average, acquirers appear to outperform their regional 
indices by 7.2% in the 
 t-1m to t+12m period around the announcement of the transaction. This is 
an interesting finding as many previous studies provide evidence to the contrary, i.e. that 
M&A deals typically destroy shareholder wealth for the acquirer (Schlingemann, Stultz and 
Moeller, 2005). We explain this average positive acquirer return by the superior ex-ante 
financial performance displayed by our study sample – as noted in Table 2 – due to their 
status as listed on the primary stock exchange index. Some interesting regional differences 
are also evident from the results presented in Table 5, Panel A. When measuring BHAR over 
the t-1m to t+12m period, we find that acquirers from Latin America earn the largest statistically 
significant returns while acquirers from Africa and the Middle East do not earn any positive 
returns which are statistically significantly different from zero. This aggregate average as 
well as the relative returns pattern does not seem to change qualitatively when the period over 
which the BHARs are calculated is increased from t+12 to t+24 or t+36 months. 
                                                          
7
 Note that for the Middle East and Africa – where no appropriately regionally defined indices could be sourced 
– we use the MSCI Emerging Markets Europe and Middle East and the MSCI Emerging Markets Europe, 




Panel B presents the data on returns at a regional level. This shows a very different pattern to 
the aggregated statistics above. For instance, as mentioned earlier, Asian acquirers are 
relatively big investors in both Europe and North America and even though, when all deals 
are taken together, they earn positive returns overall (10.8% Panel A), they do not earn 
statistically significantly positive returns on their European deals. There appear, therefore, to 
be significant variations in cross-regional deal performance. 
 
This naturally leads to formal testing in order to see whether the variations in performance 
can be explained by Hypotheses 1 and 2 – the role of investors with regional expertise when 
M&A markets are most divergent. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1. Empirical tests on the effects of institutional investors’ regional 
expertise 
Our three-level dataset consists of 748 cross-border deals, and 4,078 unique institutional 
investors representing 75,555 unique observations of institutional investor foreign expertise. 
Therefore, the average number of institutional investors that are present on each acquirer’s 
share register for a given deal is 101 (with a median of 7).8 Given that our final sample 
                                                          
8
 The substantial difference between the average and median number of investors registered on a given deal 
reflects the large difference between the maximum (956) and minimum (1) number of investors present on the 
acquirer’s share register for a given deal.   
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consists of 4, 078 unique institutional investors, we conclude that there are approximately 
18.5 unique shareholders involved in each of the 748 M&A deals.9 
 
As our regressions are run at the institutional investor level (from the acquirer share register), 
we note that clustering issues might arise. It is certainly plausible that the same investor could 
be a shareholder in multiple acquirers in the sample, especially for acquirers in the same 
region. If two (or more) acquirers with the same investor(s) on their share register invest in 
the same region, the effect of our KnI_II variable on deal success might be overstated. We 
control for this issue by adding cluster controls on the Investor name in a panel regression 
setting. All regression models illustrated in Tables 6 through 12 control for this issue. Using 
the BHAR performance of bidders, adjusted to a size-specific index to control for the 
potential bias in our sample of primary index-listed acquirers being larger than the average 
firm, we test the relationship between the acquirers’ post-merger performance over an event 
window of t-1m to t+12m and the degree of regional expertise of the acquirers’ informed 
investors,10 i.e. estimating Equation (1) with the results reported in Table 6. 
 
Place Table 6 here 
 
The results for H1 > 0  indicate that there is a significant and positive relationship between 
the level of regional expertise that the acquirer’s informed investors possess and post-bid 
performance. Specifically, models 1, 2 and 3 in Table 6 show that the coefficient which 
corresponds to the variable that quantifies the regional expertise of each monitoring investor, 
                                                          
9
 In order to capture these different methods of accounting for our sample, Tables 6 through 12 report the 
number of unique institutional investors, the number of M&A deals and the number of observations for each 
estimated regression.  
10
 To control for any potential diminishing time effect, we test the same relationship over a longer time period, 
namely the acquirer BHAR over an event window of t-1m to t+36m. Our conclusions are robust to this control, 
presented in Table 6, Models 3 and 4. 
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namely KnI_II, is positive and statistically significantly different from zero. This latter result 
provides support for Hypothesis 1: that informed investors which possess specialised regional 
knowledge about the target’s geographical region (acquired due to existing investments in the 
region) can contribute to the success of cross-regional M&A deals. 
 
In addition, the regression results presented in Table 6, (models 2 and 4), provide support for 
the second hypothesis developed in this study: that H2 > 0 is positive. Specifically, the 
models show that the regional expertise of knowledge-intensive institutional investors is 
more useful (in the sense that it adds more value to subsequent acquirer performance) when 
the target country’s M&A market is most divergent from the acquirer’s home M&A market 
(as indicated by a positive and bigger difference in the M&A Maturity Index scores of the 
acquirer and target countries). Specifically, the coefficient on the interaction variable KnI_II x 
Rel_Maturity is positive and significant. Models 2 and 4 show that the expertise of informed 
investors is more important in cases where the ‘distance’ between the M&A maturity of the 
acquirer and target countries is wider. 
 
As demonstrated by Table 6 (model 2), the coefficient corresponding to the variable KnI_II, 
which measures the knowledge of the target region that each investor on the acquirer share 
register possesses, is equal to 0.053. The size of the coefficient indicates that for every 
percentage point increase in the investor’s expertise (or for every percentage point increase in 
the proportion of the knowledge-intensive investor’s portfolio that is invested in the target 
region), the t-1m to t+12m BHAR of the acquirer increases by 0.053 percentage points on 
average. Similarly, the coefficient corresponding to the variable KnI_II x Rel_Maturity, 
which measures the importance of knowledge of the target’s M&A market for cases where 
acquirer’s home M&A market is divergent from the target country’s M&A market, is equal to 
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0.415. The size of the coefficient indicates that for every percentage point increase in the 
product of the investor’s knowledge of the target region and the degree to which the 
acquirer’s home M&A market is more developed than the target’s (measured by the 
difference in M&A maturity scores between the acquirer and target countries), the t-1m to t+12m 
BHAR of the acquirer increases by 0.415 percentage points. 
 
The fact that the regional expertise of the low and very low turnover investor class has a 
positive association with acquirers’ post-merger performance is in accordance with the line of 
argument put forward by Chen et al. (2007), who argue that independent, long-term 
institutional investors gather information about the overall quality of firm management and 
its tendency to make better or worse decisions. Independent, long-term institutional investors 
also gather information about the scope of their influence over the actions of firm managers 
and invest in companies where the benefits associated with the quality of management and 
the opportunity to influence managerial decisions outweigh the costs of gathering information 
and monitoring the companies. Moreover, the finding that there is a positive association 
between the post-merger performance of bidders with the pre-acquisition holdings of 
institutional investors which possess specialised knowledge about the M&A market of the 
target’s region demonstrates the idea that this class of informed investor is better positioned 
to gather information about individual investment projects such as cross-border deals. 
 
4.2. Robustness tests 
We conduct a bank of further tests to determine whether our principal result H2 > 0 remains 
if we account for a number of additional factors that could be driving the regression results. 
 
4.2.1 Alternative sources of regional expertise 
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First, we re-estimate our original models (presented in Table 6) by including a number of 
control variables that capture other potential sources of expertise about the target’s M&A 
environment. We account for any previous acquisitions that the acquirer has completed in the 
target region by including the dummy variable ‘Prior Exp'. The results, presented in Table 7, 
model 1, show that it loads with a significant positive coefficient, but does not affect the sign 
or significance of H2. 
 
Following the methodology of Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012), we identify the “bulge 
bracket” banks that are generally acknowledged to have superior deal expertise. Specifically, 
we include a new dummy variable ‘Top_Advis’ which accounts for whether the investment 
bank is bulge bracket or not. The inclusion of this variable in Table 7, model 2 does not affect 
the sign or significance of H2. In fact 'Top_Advis' loads with a significant negative 
coefficient. This result is slightly surprising as large investment banks are expected to supply 
clients with regional expertise due to their large scale and global reach. However, our sample 
differs significantly from the reference paper in that we focus only on cross-border 
transactions and often on public-to-private transactions. Our result seems to suggest that 
although top tier advisors can add significant deal-specific expertise, they are less likely to 
add value in terms of regional specific expertise. 
 
We identify those deals for which internal expertise on the target region's M&A environment 
may already exist, by accounting for the cases in which the acquirer already has a foreign 
subsidiary in the target region at the time of the deal announcement. This new variable, 
‘Prior_Sub’, loads with a significant positive coefficient (Table 7, model 3); however, its 
inclusion does not affect the sign or significance of H2, suggesting that any internal expertise 
gained from having a foreign subsidiary does not negate the role of institutional investors. In 
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addition, we use a dummy variable ‘Domic_Tar_Reg’ (Table 7, model 4) to control for the 
possibility that the regional expertise of the institutional investor does not solely stem from it 
being domiciled in the target region – as opposed to being an investor in the target region 
which is our main proxy for expertise. The results show that this additional control variable 
loads with a significant positive coefficient but, as in all the cases described above, it does not 
affect the sign or significance of H2. We also report the results of adding all of the above 
variables that account for alternative sources of foreign market expertise jointly in Table 7, 
model 5. The inclusion of these new control variables does not negate the positive effect of 
the institutional investor knowledge of the target region. 
 
Finally, we consider whether the number of joint ventures or strategic alliances that the 
acquirer company has already completed in the region of the target, which we label 
‘Prior_JV_or_Alliance’, can have an effect on post-M&A performance. We also interact this 
additional control variable with our variable for divergence between the acquirer and target 
country, 'Rel_Maturity'. The new variable, ‘Prior_JV_or_Alliance’, loads with a small 
significant positive coefficient (Table 8, model 1) while the interaction variable, 
'Prior_JV_or_Alliance x Rel_Maturity', does not load with a significant coefficient (Table 8, 
model 2). The sign and significance of H2 remain unaffected (Table 8, models 1 and 2). 
 
4.2.2 Alternative measures of the discrepancy in M&A environments 
It is possible that there are other, more adequate measures of the discrepancy between the 
target and acquirer's M&A environments. We use the geographic distance between the target 
and acquirer countries as an alternative measure of market discrepancy. We test to see if this 
new variable 'Geog_Dist' can replace 'Rel_Maturity' as the explanatory variable for 
coefficient H2 (Table 9, model 1). While the new variable loaded by itself with significant 
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negative coefficient, the interaction coefficient H2 , 'Knl_II x Geog_Dist', was not 
significant. In Table 9, model 2, we allowed both 'Rel_Maturity' and 'Geog_Dist' to interact 
with 'Knl_II' and found, as hypothesized, that only 'Rel_Maturity' interacted with 'Knl_II' is 
significant. In an un-tabulated analysis, we also tested market discrepancy using a different 
proxy, a dummy variable which is equal to one when the target and acquirer are domiciled in 
different geographical regions, with the sign and significance of our main variable of interest, 
H2 , remaining unaffected. These results present additional evidence in favour of our original 
premise that the role of institutional investors as information providers is not simply 
explained by geographic distance but instead by differences in the maturity of markets. We 
expected this result as while, for example, Singapore is a long geographic distance from the 
US, the relative maturity of their M&A markets are quite similar and we would not expect the 
potential information provision of institutional investors to be of as much value as when the 
difference between the relative maturities of the countries is greater. That is, it is not 
geographic distance that matters but ‘distance’ in relative maturities. 
 
4.2.3 Alternative measures of M&A success 
We use a range of different performance measures, including regional and size BHAR 
benchmarks run over medium-term (t-1m to t+12m) and long-term (t-1m to t+36m) event windows. 
The sign and significance of H2 remain unchanged (Table 10, models 1 through 4). In 
addition, as an alternative measure of success we also collect data on the value of 
impairments in any of the five years following completion of the deal. With this new 
dependent variable, Table 11, model 1 reports that the significance of H2 remains 
unchanged, with a negative sign, since more subsequent impairments are associated with less 
success. We also measure performance by considering the likelihood of deal completion after 
controlling for whether the deal is a tender offer ‘Tender Offer’, whether there is a competing 
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bid, ‘Competing Bid’, and whether there is a target firm termination fee clause, ‘Target Term 
Fee’. Again, the sign and significance of H2 remain unchanged (Table 11, model 2). Note 
that we use a larger deal data sample for this model, which includes the terminated deals in 
the same time period. 
 
4.2.3 Deal level, serial acquirers and primary index-listing sensitivity analysis 
In order to see whether the positive effect of institutional investor expertise applies to 
companies listed on non-primary exchange indices, we re-estimate our original regressions 
with a larger sample of all public acquirers. The results reported in Table 12, model 1 
demonstrate that the sign and significance of H2 remain unchanged.11 It should be noted that 
in Table 12, we re-estimate the original regressions with the larger sample by including all 
the additional controls simultaneously in the regression (Table 12, model 2). The sign and 
significance of H2 remain unchanged. To control for the possibility that some acquirers may 
complete more than one M&A deal within the same BHAR event window, we re-estimate 
model 2 in Table 12 by using a sample of non-serial acquirers only. Adding this restriction 
considerably reduces the sample size however the sign and significance of H2 remain 
unchanged. 
 
As our primary concern is the knowledge of specific institutional investors (who may be 
present on multiple deals), our main unit of analysis is each institutional investor’s portfolio 
holding in the target region. As already stated, we control for clusters of investor name as 
each investor could be on several acquirer’s share registers. However, there is a second 
                                                          
11 We note that there are two additional control variables included in Tables 12 and 13, namely, ‘Any_II_Leave’ 
(which measures the number of institutional investors that sell their holdings in the acquirer company within six 
months of a deal announcement) and ‘Acquisitive_CrossBorder_Mean’ (which accounts for the acquirers that 
perform a number of international deals which is greater than the average number of international deals 
completed by all firms within the last year and zero otherwise). These additional controls were inspired by 
comments received at conference presentations. 
30 
 
potential cluster effect, namely that of each deal. As we cannot test for the deal-level cluster 
effect in the current model we replicate the analysis on a deal level, with the results reported 
in Table 13. Our original results on the sign and significance of H2  remain unchanged. We 
perform this analysis using the original controls (Table 13, model 1) and also including the 
additional controls (Table 13, model 2). We control for the potential noise in the data caused 
by follow-on acquisition effect our BHAR event window by performing the regressions 
excluding any deal which is performed by a ‘serial acquirer’ – here defined as one which 
completes multiple deals within a time window of three years in model 3.12  
 
5. Conclusion 
Traditional research on information flows in financial markets concentrates on flows from 
firms to investors. However, motivated by the earlier theoretical work of Dye and Sridhar 
(2002), we investigate whether there may be value in information which flows in the opposite 
direction, i.e. from investors to firms. Keeping within the spirit of the Dye and Sridhar model, 
we look at cross-border M&A deals with potentially widely distributed information and 
attempt to identify settings in which the management of firms could learn from investors 
which have experience and expertise in the target region. We propose here that such expertise 
held by investors is likely to benefit the management of a potential acquirer most when the 
target country is significantly less developed in terms of M&A maturity compared to the 
acquirer country, i.e. when the divergence of the two markets is large and hence the extent of 
information asymmetry is greater. Thus, we conclude that going naked (without informed 
investor support) into foreign deals in complex (diverse maturity), cross-regional settings 
may be dangerous for the bottom line.  
                                                          
12
 We note that the sign and significance of the coefficient βH2 remains but the magnitude of the coefficient 
increases dramatically. While this agrees with our hypothesis, we suggest the exercise of caution here as 
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
Number Variable name Definition Expected sign 
1 BHAR_Reti,j The buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) which accrue to acquirers’ low and very low turnover shareholder i from deal j measured 
over a 12-month event window starting one month prior to announcement in order to capture the run-up period.  *** 
2 KnI_II 
Investor regional expertise: the percentage of the total portfolio of the acquirer’s low and very low turnover shareholders which is 
invested in the region of the target company. Note that for the purposes of performing the analysis at the deal level, this variable is 
defined as the number of all low and very low turnover institutional investors that have any portfolio holding in the region of the target. 
+ 
3 Rel_Maturity 
Relative maturity: the difference between the M&A maturity of the acquirer and target countries. M&A maturity is measured by the 
M&A Maturity Index, which rates 148 countries in terms of their degree of development for M&A purposes. The country index is 
calculated by using an average weighting of six groups of factors which have been identified in previous research as critical for a market 
to attract and sustain M&A activity, namely, regulatory and political, financial and economic, technological, socio-economic,  
development of physical infrastructure and availability of assets. 
+/- 
4 KnI_II x Rel_Maturity 
Knowledge-intensive institutional investors interacted with relative maturity: this variable captures the effect of knowledge-intensive 
institutional investors as determined by the M&A maturity gap between the acquirer and target countries. It is expected that in cases 
where the target country is less mature for M&A purposes than the acquirer country, the effect of knowledge-intensive institutional 
investors on post-M&A performance should be more positive. 
+ 
5 Prct_Held_B Percentage held before the deal announcement: the percentage of outstanding bidder company shares that the low and/or very low turnover investor i holds in acquirer j measured three months prior to the announcement of the deal. +/- 
6 Cult_Dist The cultural distance between the acquirer and target countries. - 
7 Deal_Val Value of M&A deal: the natural logarithm of the M&A deal value measured in millions of US dollars. - 
8 Hostile Hostile deal dummy: variable which is equal to 1 if the deal is hostile and 0 otherwise. + 
9 Ind_Relat. Industry relatedness between target and acquirer dummy: variable which is equal to 1 if the target and acquirer four-digit SIC (Standard Industry Classification) codes are the same and 0 otherwise. + 
10 All_Cash Method of payment is all-cash dummy: variable which is equal to 1 if the method of payment for the M&A deal is all cash and 0 
otherwise. + 
11 MV_BVAcq Y-1 Market-to-book ratio of the acquirer company: equal to the market value divided by the book value of the acquirer one year before the 





Table 1: Variable definitions – continued 
Number Variable name Definition Expected sign 
12 TD_TAAcq Y-1 Ratio of total debt to total assets of the acquirer company: equal to the total debt divided by the total assets of the acquirer company one year before the announcement of the deal. +/- 
13 LiquidAcq Y-1 Liquidity of acquirer company: equal to the cash and cash equivalents divided by the total assets of the acquirer one year before the 
announcement of the deal. - 
14 TurnovAcq Share turnover of acquirer company: equal to the trading volume divided by the total outstanding shares of the acquirer company 
measured three months before the announcement of the deal. - 
15 Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar The difference between acquirer country and target country in the anti-self-dealing index: the anti-self-dealing index, as developed by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008). + 
16 Prior_Exp Acquirer prior experience: equal to 1 when the acquirer has completed an earlier deal in the target region. + 
17 Top_Advis Top advisor: equal 1 to when the acquirer is advised by a global investment bank. + 
18 Prior_Sub Prior subsidiary: equal to 1 when the acquirer has a subsidiary in the target region. + 
19 Domic_Tar_Reg Domiciled in the region of the target: equal to 1 when the institutional investor on the acquirer’s share register is domiciled in the target 
region. + 
20 Prior_JV_or_Alliance Prior joint venture or alliance: the natural logarithm of the number of joint ventures or strategic alliances that the acquirer had completed in the target region before the current deal. + 
21 Geog_Dist’ Geographic distance: the natural logarithm of the geographic distance between the acquirer and target region. - 
22 Tender_Offer Tender offer: equal to 1 if the deal is classified as a ‘tender offer’ by the SDC Platinum Database and 0 otherwise. + 
23 Competing_Bidder Competing bidder: equal to 1 if there are any competing bidders and 0 otherwise. +/- 
24 Target_Term_Fee Target termination fee: equal to 1 if there is a target company termination fee clause in the deal agreement document and 0 otherwise. + 
25 Any_II_Leave Any institutional investors which leaves: the number of institutional investors that dispose of their holdings in the acquirer company 
within six months of the announcement of the M&A deal.  - 
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*** Please note that this is the dependent variable in our model. 
** Please note that this variable is used to control for cluster effects. 
* Please note that these variables are used to compare the characteristics of our final study sample to the sample of M&A deals which are excluded from this study (presented in Table 2). 
Table 1: Variable definitions – continued 
Number Variable name Definition Expected sign 
26 Acquisitive_CrossBorder_Mean’  Acquisitive company in terms of average cross border deals: equal to 1 when the number of international deals which the acquirer has 
completed is greater than the average number of international deals completed. +/- 
27 Investor name The name of the low and very low turnover investor that is present on the acquirer’s share register.  ** 
28 DV_MVAcq Ratio of deal value to market value: equal to the M&A transaction value divided by the market value of the acquirer 20 days prior to the 
announcement of the deal. * 
29 MVAcq Y-1 The market value of the acquirer one year prior to the announcement of the deal, measured in thousands of US dollars. * 
30 SalesAcq Y-1 The net sales/revenue of the acquirer one year prior to the announcement of the deal, measured in thousands of US dollars. * 
31 ROEAcq Y-1 Acquirer return on equity: acquirer net income divided by common shareholder’s equity one year prior to the announcement of the deal. * 
32 EBIT_MGAcq Y-1 Acquirer EBIT margin: equal to earnings before interest and tax divided by net sales one year prior to the announcement of the deal. * 
33 ICRAcq Y-1 Acquirer interest cover ratio: equal to earnings before interest and tax divided by the net interest expense of the acquirer one year prior to the announcement of the deal. * 
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Table 2: Cross-border acquirers and transaction characteristics 
Sample All (2,065) - A Study-sample (748) - B Excluded (1,317) - C Mean test (A-B) Median test (A-B) Mean test (C-B) Median test (C-B) 
Variable Average Median Average Median Average Median t-stat. Pearson Chi2 t-stat. Pearson Chi2 
Deal_val 495*** 59*** 1086 257 282*** 36*** -8.92 258.91 -13.59 421.78 
DV_MV 59% 5%*** 10% 2% 77.05%* 6%*** 1.19 95.11 0.01 163.53 
MVAcq Y-1 9,416,841*** 1,105,015*** 21,550,815 8,807,284 4,770,547*** 485,998*** -12.46 458.65 -18.97 770.07 
MV_BVAcq Y-1 2.17 2.02** 3.05 2.22 1.83 1.96*** -0.61 5.51 -0.72 10.6 
SalesAcq Y-1 8,551,202*** 766,706*** 19,844,048 7,046,057 4,369,264*** 295,973*** -12.23 474.47 -18.20 793.47 
ROEAcq Y-1 5.32%** 13%*** 15.87% 16% 1.27%*** 11%*** -2.29 43.69 -2.71 78.09 
EBIT_MGAcq Y-1 -84.24%* 11%*** 12% 13% -122.85%** 10%*** -1.58 22.17 -1.87 38.9 
TD_TAAcq Y-1 23% 20%*** 25% 23% 22% 17%*** -0.96 24.99 -1.14 47.24 
LiquidAcq Y-1 18.84%*** 12%*** 12% 7% 20.99%*** 14%*** 9.5 61.26 11.68 96.31 
ICRAcq Y-1 37.31*** 5.84*** 28.04 6.12 41.17*** 5.61*** -6.53 373.99 -9.67 582.33 
This table compares the key acquirer and deal characteristics of the study sample to the initial sample with all of the available information (i.e. including primary index-listed acquirers) and to the sample of 
excluded acquirers. ‘All (2,065) - A’ refers to the sample of all public acquirers for which accounting and share register information is available and which are also listed on non-primary exchanges. ‘Study-sample 
(748) - B’ refers to the final sample of deals used for the purposes of the analysis performed in this study. ‘Excluded (1,317) -C’ refers to the sample of deals which are excluded from the analysis due to the fact 
that they are not listed on a primary stock exchange index. Company financials are obtained from Datastream and measured in US$ while deal value is measured in millions of US$. ‘Deal_val’ stands for the value 
of the M&A transaction; ‘DV_MV’ is measured as the ratio of the M&A deal value to the acquirer market value as of 20 days before the announcement of the deal; ‘MVAcq Y-1’ stands for the market value of the 
acquirer as of one year prior to the announcement of the deal; ‘MV_BVAcq Y-1’ measures the acquirer market-to-book ratio as of one year prior to the announcement of the deal;  ‘SalesAcquirer Y-1’ measures the 
acquirer net sales as of one year prior to the announcement of the deal; ‘ROE’ is measured in % terms and represents net income before preferred dividends less the preferred dividend requirement divided by last 
year's common equity, and is calculated by Datastream; ‘EBIT_MGAcq Y-1’ is measured as the ratio of EBIT to net sales as of one year before the announcement of the deal; ‘TD_TAAcq Y-1’ is measured as total debt 
divided by total assets; ‘LiquidAcq Y-1’ is measured as the ratio of acquirer cash and equivalents divided by total assets as of one year prior to the announcement of the deal; and ‘ICRAcq Y-1’ is measured as the  ratio 
of acquirer EBIT divided by net interest expense as of one year prior to the announcement of the deal. 




Table 3: M&A deals and investor expertise per sample region 
Panel A: Number of completed cross-border deals per regional pair 
Target region ĺ 
Acquirer region Ļ 







Africa 4 0 9 5 1 3 6 28 
Asia 0 74 52 2 1 43 14 186 
Europe 18 43 351 45 8 158 16 639 
Latin America 2 0 0 3 0 12 0 17 
Middle East 0 6 2 0 3 12 0 23 
North America 4 25 120 19 9 67 22 266 
Pacific 2 12 24 2 0 21 16 77 
All 30 160 558 76 22 316 74 1,236 
Panel A shows the cross-border deal flow (number) in the sample from the acquirer region to the target region over the sample period 
(1,236 in total from all regions to all regions). 
 
Panel B: Proportion of completed cross-border deals per regional pair 
Target region ĺ 
Acquirer region Ļ 







Africa 0.14 0.00 0.32 0.18 0.04 0.11 0.21 1.00 
Asia 0.00 0.40 0.28 0.01 0.01 0.23 0.08 1.00 
Europe 0.03 0.07 0.55 0.07 0.01 0.25 0.03 1.00 
Latin America 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.71 0.00 1.00 
Middle East 0.00 0.26 0.09 0.00 0.13 0.52 0.00 1.00 
North America 0.01 0.09 0.45 0.07 0.03 0.25 0.08 1.00 
Pacific 0.03 0.16 0.31 0.03 0.00 0.27 0.21 1.00 
Panel B shows the proportion of cross-border deal flow in the sample from the acquirer region to the target region over the sample 
period (1,236 in total from all regions to all regions). 
 
Panel C: Average investor regional expertise (KnI_II) 
Target region ĺ 
 
























Africa 0.28 - 0.34 0.03 - 0.30 0.03 0.19 0.19 
Asia - 0.24 0.34 0.01 0.00 0.36 0.01 0.30 0.32 
Europe 0.01 0.11 0.48 0.01 0.02 0.28 0.02 0.35 0.22 
Latin America 0.00 - - 0.12 - 0.32 - 0.28 0.31 
Middle East - 0.11 0.32 - 0.33 0.44 - 0.21 0.21 
North America 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.64 0.01 0.26 0.16 
Pacific - 0.21 0.28 0.01 - 0.32 0.05 0.24 0.28 
Panel C illustrates the average level of expertise in the target region which acquirers have on their share registers pre-announcement. 
Specifically, it shows the average portfolio allocation in the target region of the low and very low turnover investors on the acquirer 
share register in the quarter prior to the announcement of the deal, i.e. our definition of knowledge-intensive institutional investors’ 
regional expertise (KnI_II). Note that the turnover classification is defined by the FactSet database and the average level of expertise is 
the equally weighted average for all low and very low turnover investors which are registered holder of the acquirers shares - for our 
sample of 1,236 completed deals – in the period reaching two quarters prior to the announcement. Columns 1 to 7 show the average 
expertise per regional pair, e.g. the value of 0.28 in the upper left cell shows that the level of regional expertise of African acquirers in 
our sample, i.e. the average portfolio allocation for low and very low turnover investor listed on the acquirer share register into the 
Africa region, is 28%. If we compare this to the cell corresponding to African acquirers investing in the European region, we can 
conclude that the level of expertise on the acquirers’ share register (34%) is on average higher than for their home region of Africa. The 
final two columns show the average regional expertise shown ex-ante on acquirers’ share registers per acquirer region but irrespective 
of target region. So, if we compare the top two listed acquirer regions, Africa and Asia, we see that Asian acquirers have on average 
more regional expertise – and should, therefore, be in a better position to evaluate investment opportunities abroad providing that their 
management teams consult their knowledge-intensive investors – on their share registers compared to African acquirers. Finally, the 




Table 4: Description of the M&A Maturity Index 
Panel A: M&A Maturity Index country ranking and index score (2012), corresponding score for the five factor groups for the top 
15 ranked countries represented in the sample 
 









United States 1 0.85 0.84 0.81 0.92 0.80 0.89 
Singapore 2 0.84 0.96 0.75 0.90 0.68 0.92 
United Kingdom 3 0.82 0.80 0.77 0.93 0.71 0.90 
Hong Kong 4 0.81 0.87 0.76 0.83 0.72 0.88 
South Korea 5 0.81 0.76 0.65 0.95 0.91 0.78 
Germany 6 0.80 0.76 0.66 0.91 0.73 0.95 
Canada 7 0.80 0.84 0.76 0.89 0.81 0.71 
France 8 0.80 0.80 0.70 0.92 0.67 0.90 
China 9 0.79 0.44 0.87 0.81 0.97 0.87 
Japan 10 0.79 0.73 0.75 0.92 0.69 0.87 
Netherlands 11 0.79 0.86 0.71 0.94 0.65 0.79 
Switzerland 12 0.79 0.86 0.75 0.93 0.60 0.78 
Australia 13 0.77 0.90 0.73 0.85 0.69 0.70 
Spain 14 0.77 0.68 0.74 0.76 0.79 0.90 
Austria 15 0.74 0.80 0.58 0.84 0.60 0.88 
 
Panel B: M&A Maturity Index country ranking and index score (2012), corresponding score for the five factor groups for the 
bottom 15 ranked countries represented in the sample. 
 









Egypt 65 0.56 0.38 0.54 0.47 0.66 0.74 
Peru 68 0.55 0.52 0.64 0.56 0.59 0.43 
Philippines 70 0.54 0.35 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.41 
Lebanon 76 0.51 0.37 0.59 0.59 0.51 0.50 
Macedonia 80 0.50 0.63 0.49 0.46 0.55 0.38 
Pakistan 86 0.47 0.21 0.46 0.37 0.65 0.64 
Bangladesh 90 0.44 0.20 0.61 0.32 0.69 0.39 
Syria 97 0.42 0.38 0.45 0.35 0.49 0.42 
Nigeria 101 0.41 0.23 0.50 0.40 0.53 0.38 
Ecuador 102 0.40 0.27 0.37 0.49 0.52 0.36 
Ghana 107 0.39 0.52 0.38 0.25 0.49 0.31 
Papua New Guinea 123 0.34 0.26 0.50 0.40 0.35 0.19 
Uganda 132 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.28 0.41 0.25 
Sierra Leone 133 0.31 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.29 0.20 
Dem. Rep. of Congo 143 0.27 0.19 0.39 0.42 0.25 0.12 
Panels A and B shows the top and bottom 15 countries in the 2012 M&A Maturity Index represented in our sample. The Rank is the country 
ranking for 2012, based on the total of 148 countries ranked in the index. The M&A Maturity Index score  – which determines the rank – is 
the weighted average of the five factor group scores including 1) Regulatory and political factors (e.g., rule of law and political stability), 2) 
Economic and financial factors (e.g., GDP growth and access to financing), 3) Technological factors (e.g., high-tech exports and 
innovation), 4) Socio-economic factors (e.g., population) and 5) Quality of infra-structure and assets (e.g. roads and railways, and the 







Table 5: Long-term acquirer performance – Buy-and-hold returns (BHAR) 
Panel A: Regional acquirer BHAR – time dependent 
Acquirer region Ļ BHAR t-1m to t+12m 
t-stats (observations) 
BHAR t-1m to t+24m 
t-stats (observations) 
BHAR t-1m to t+36m 
t-stats (observations) 
Africa 0.042 0.076 0.032 
 0.616 (28) 0.461 (23) 0.104 (21) 
Asia 0.108*** 0.163*** 0.295*** 
 4.883 (186) 4.961 (164) 5.675 (140) 
Europe 0.053*** 0.121*** 0.215*** 
 5.061 (639) 6.729 (607) 7.144 (561) 
Latin America 0.175** 0.198* 0.086 
 2.257 (17) 1.928 (15) 0.729 (14) 
Middle East -0.105 -0.103 -0.151 
 -1.318 (23) -0.795 (19) -0.910 (17) 
North America 0.095*** 0.236*** 0.415*** 
 4.481 (266) 7.230 (243) 8.129 (209) 
Pacific 0.109*** 0.175*** 0.392*** 
 2.969 (77) 3.184 (70) 4.709 (63) 
All 0.072*** 0.151*** 0.266*** 
 8.499 (1,236) 11.567 (1,141) 12.826 (1,025) 
Panel A shows the equally-weighted buy-and-hold portfolio returns (BHAR) for all acquirers which completed a cross-border deal during 
the sample period (1,236 deals). The matrix shows the performance per acquirer region and BHAR period, ranging from month -1, before 
the announcement, to months 12, 24 and 36 after the announcement. Each period shows the average abnormal total return, adjusted to the 
regional MSCI index and the corresponding t-statistics and number of observations. Note that for the Middle East and Africa – where no 
appropriate regionally defined indices for the sample period could be sourced – we use the MSCI Emerging Markets Europe and Middle 
East and the MSCI Emerging Markets Europe, Middle East and Africa indices, respectively. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel B: Regional acquirer BHAR – target region dependent 
Target region ĺ 
 

















Africa -0.02 - 0.15 0.11* 0.33 0.08 -0.20 
 -0.17 (4) - (0) 1.18 (9) 1.74 (5) - (1) 1.14 (3) -0.93 (6) 
Asia - 0.16*** 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.11** 0.08** 
 - (0) 3.46 (74) 1.30 (52) 0.25 (2) - (1) 2.80 (43) 2.11 (14) 
Europe 0.09 0.06 0.05*** 0.00 0.09** 0.05*** 0.04 
 1.36 (18) 1.51 (43) 3.51 (351) 0.12 (45) 2.04 (8) 3.21 (158) 0.51 (16) 
Latin America 0.26 - - 0.17 - 0.16 - 
 0.84 (2) - (0) - (0) 1.02 (3) - (0) 1.64 (12) - (0) 
Middle East - 0.14 -0.09 - -0.37* -0.16* - 
 - (0) 0.70 (6) -0.50 (2) - (0) -1.83 (3) -1.82 (12) - (0) 
North America -0.12 0.15* 0.09** 0.17* 0.14* 0.09*** 0.01 
 -1.43 (4) 1.97 (25) 2.82 (120) 1.69 (19) 1.88 (9) 2.59 (67) 0.15 (22) 
Pacific 0.09 -0.01 0.12* 0.17*** - 0.17** 0.10 
 0.59 (2) -0.06 (12) 1.74 (24) 4.39 (2) - (0) 2.13 (21) 1.43 (16) 
Panel B shows the equally-weighted buy-and-hold portfolio returns (BHAR) for all acquirers which completed a cross-border deal during 
the sample period (1,236 deals). The matrix shows the performance per acquirer and target region, with the BHAR period ranging from 
month -1, before the announcement, to month 12 after the announcement. Each cell shows the average abnormal total return, adjusted to the 
regional MSCI index and the corresponding t-statistics and number of observations. Note that for the Middle East and Africa – where no 
appropriate regionally defined indices for the sample period could be sourced – we use the MSCI Emerging Markets Europe and Middle 
East and the MSCI Emerging Markets Europe, Middle East and Africa indices, respectively. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Analysis of
 t-1m to t+12m and t-1m to t+36m post-M&A performance 
The dependent variable is the acquirer BHAR returns over the -1 to +12- and +36-months adjusted by the MSCI World Size Index 
corresponding to each acquirer company. ‘KnI_II’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional 
investors on the acquirer share register, ‘KnI_II x Rel_Maturity’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive 
institutional investors on the acquirer share register multiplied by the difference in M&A maturity between the target and acquirer countries, 
‘Cult_Dist’ is the cultural distance between the acquirer and target countries, ‘Prct_Held_B’ is the percentage of outstanding shares which each 
institutional investor has in the acquirer, ‘Deal_Val’ is the M&A deal value measured in millions of US $, ‘Hostile’ equals 1 when the deal is 
hostile and 0 otherwise, ‘Ind_Relat.’ equals 1 when the target and acquirer operate in the same industry and 0 otherwise, ‘All_Cash’ equals 1 
when the method of payment is all cash and 0 otherwise, ‘MV_BVAcq’ is the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer, ‘TD_TAAcq’ is the ratio of 
total debt to total assets, ‘LiquidAcq’ is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, ‘TurnovAcq’ is the trading volume divided by total 
outstanding shares three months before the announcement of the deal, ‘Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar’ is the difference between the acquirer and target 
countries’ anti-self-dealing index values, and ‘Rel_Maturity’ is the difference between acquirer and target M&A maturity. We estimate our 
regressions with fixed effect panel specification, where the unique investor name represents the cluster variable in the panel. For our main 
regression specification, where we use the acquirer BHAR returns over the 12-month period post-M&A performance adjusted by the MSCI 
World Size Index, the underlying deal data sample is 748 deals. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are not estimated on the basis 
of a random sample or that the distributions of our independent variables and regression residual are not independent or identically distributed 
(i.i.d.), all models have a robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each 
independent variable. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
(1) Dependent variable: 
 
t-1m to t+12m BHAR 
(2) Dependent variable: 
 
t-1m to t+12m BHAR 
(3) Dependent variable: 
 
t-1m to t+36m BHAR 
(4) Dependent variable: 
 
t-1m to t+36m BHAR 
Institutional investor expertise 
Knl_II 0.062*** 0.053*** 0.024*** 0.004 
 15.640 13.200 4.380 0.700 
KnI_II x Rel_Maturity 
 0.415***  1.698*** 
  6.750  10.340 
Control variables     
Cult_Dist 0.004*** 0.003*** -0.019*** -0.022*** 
 4.030 2.920 -10.150 -10.350 
Prct_Held_B 0.087 0.083 0.219 0.262 
 1.130 1.080 1.080 1.280 
Deal_Val -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.058*** -0.059*** 
 -24.880 -23.580 -35.900 -35.540 
Hostile -0.083*** -0.089*** -0.039*** -0.046*** 
 -13.070 -14.020 -3.920 -4.560 
Ind_Relat. 0.033*** 0.027*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 
 15.550 12.810 35.310 34.510 
All_Cash 0.084*** 0.076*** 0.067*** 0.078*** 
 40.780 37.700 18.920 21.630 
MV_BVAcq Y-1 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 -20.590 -18.980 -21.970 -21.010 
TD_TAAcq Y-1 -0.015** -0.022*** 0.254*** 0.252*** 
 -2.440 -3.490 11.700 11.670 
LiquidAcq Y-1 -0.321*** -0.324*** -0.174*** -0.154*** 
 -29.260 -29.370 -7.190 -6.320 
TurnovAcq 0.045*** -0.031** -0.060** -0.069** 
 3.690 -2.590 -2.240 -2.430 
Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.029*** 0.001 
 9.660 10.530 4.130 0.110 
Rel_Maturity 
 -0.103***  0.113*** 
  -5.450  4.060 
Constant 1.145*** 1.161*** 1.416*** 1.404*** 
 190.900 192.470 93.290 89.700 
Unique institutional investors 4,078 4,078 3,758 3,758 
Cross-border M&A deals 748 748 697 697 
Number of observations 75,555 75,555 64,945 64,945 
Wald Chi2 363.46 333.88 391.76 392.09 
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Table 7: Analysis of
 t-1m to t+12m post-M&A performance (Alternative sources of regional expertise) 
The dependent variable is the acquirer BHAR returns over the -1 to +12 months period by the MSCI World Size Index corresponding to each 
acquirer company. ‘KnI_II’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer share 
register, ‘KnI_II x Rel_Maturity’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer 
share register multiplied by the difference in M&A maturity between the target and acquirer countries, ‘Cult_Dist’ is the cultural distance 
between the acquirer and target countries, ‘Prct_Held_B’ is the percentage of outstanding shares which each institutional investor has in the 
acquirer, ‘Deal_Val’ is the M&A deal value measured in millions of US $, ‘Hostile’ equals 1 when the deal is hostile and 0 otherwise, 
‘Ind_Relat.’ equals 1 when the target and acquirer operate in the same industry and 0 otherwise, ‘All_Cash’ equals 1 when the method of 
payment is all cash and 0 otherwise, ‘MV_BVAcq’ is the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer, ‘TD_TAAcq’ is the ratio of total debt to total 
assets, ‘LiquidAcq’ is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, ‘TurnovAcq’ is the trading volume divided by total outstanding 
shares three months before the announcement of the deal, ‘Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar’ is the difference between the acquirer and target countries’ 
anti-self-dealing index values, ‘Prior_Exp’ equals 1 when the acquirer completed an earlier deal in the target region, ‘Top_Advis’ equals 1 when 
the acquirer is advised by a global investment bank, ‘Prior_Sub’ equals 1 when the acquirer has a subsidiary in the target region, 
‘Domic_Tar_Reg’ equals 1 when the institutional investor on the acquirer’s share register is domiciled in the target region, and ‘Rel_Maturity’ is 
the difference between acquirer and target M&A maturity. We estimate our regressions with fixed effect panel specification, where the unique 
investor name represents the cluster variable in the panel. For our main regression specification, where we use the acquirer BHAR returns over 
the 12-month period post-M&A performance adjusted by the MSCI World Size Index, the underlying deal data sample is 748 deals. To correct 
for the possibility that our coefficients are not estimated on the basis of a random sample or that the distributions of our independent variables 
and regression residual are not independent or identically distributed (i.i.d.), all models have a robust estimate of variance following Huber 
(1967) and White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each independent variable. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Institutional investor expertise 
Knl_II 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 
 8.710 7.670 8.190 6.270 4.420 
KnI_II x Rel_Maturity 1.066*** 1.047*** 0.920*** 1.037*** 0.894*** 
 14.130 13.840 12.090 13.720 11.930 
Control variables 
Cult_Dist 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.002** 
 1.030 1.520 1.760 1.380 2.120 
Prct_Held_B 0.022 0.026 0.027 0.013 0.036 
 0.440 0.520 0.530 0.260 0.720 
Deal_Val -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.014*** 
 -20.520 -26.280 -27.710 -26.770 -22.020 
Hostile -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.080*** -0.085*** -0.084*** 
 -17.260 -16.890 -15.740 -16.590 -16.600 
Ind_Relat. 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 
 5.860 6.350 8.000 5.320 7.410 
All_Cash 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 
 46.640 47.510 47.100 47.080 47.600 
MV_BVAcq Y-1 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 -17.190 -16.020 -17.280 -19.150 -13.150 
TD_TAAcq Y-1 0.020*** 0.008 -0.004 0.019*** -0.002 
 4.600 1.680 -0.720 4.470 -0.410 
LiquidAcq Y-1 -0.220*** -0.228*** -0.238*** -0.223*** -0.235*** 
 -30.080 -29.930 -31.060 -30.510 -29.830 
TurnovAcq -0.077*** -0.080*** -0.068*** -0.083*** -0.066*** 
 -11.800 -12.340 -10.350 -12.700 -9.920 
Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 
 7.980 7.050 10.350 8.190 9.000 
Prior_Exp 0.000***    0.000*** 
 17.250    16.740 
Top_Advis  -0.010***   -0.010*** 
  -6.650   -6.460 
Prior_Sub 
 
 0.013***  0.007*** 
   6.620  3.570 
Domic_Tar_Reg 
 
  0.016*** 0.015*** 
    8.780 8.130 
Rel_Maturity -0.059*** -0.047*** -0.069*** -0.038*** -0.039*** 
 -4.650 -3.660 -5.350 -2.880 -2.960 
Constant 1.096*** 1.095*** 1.111*** 1.100*** 1.096*** 
 257.580 267.340 262.690 270.770 244.560 
Unique institutional 
investors 4,078 4,078 4,078 4,078 4,078 
Cross-border M&A deals 748 748 748 748 748 
Number of observations 75,555 75,555 75,555 75,555 75,555 
Wald Chi2 6887.41 6628.78 6565.32 6507.77 7246.85 
 46 
 
Table 8: Analysis of
 t-1m to t+12m post-M&A performance (Alternative sources of regional expertise continued) 
The dependent variable is the acquirer BHAR returns over the -1 to +12 months period adjusted by the MSCI World Size Index corresponding to 
each acquirer company. ‘KnI_II’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer 
share register, ‘KnI_II x Rel_Maturity’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the 
acquirer share register multiplied by the difference in M&A maturity between the target and acquirer countries, ‘Prior_JV_or_Alliance  x 
Rel_Maturity is the natural logarithm of the number of joint ventures or strategic alliances that the acquirer completed in the target region before 
the current deal multiplied by the difference in M&A maturity between the target and acquirer countries,  ‘Cult_Dist’ is the cultural distance 
between the acquirer and target countries, ‘Prct_Held_B’ is the percentage of outstanding shares which each institutional investor has in the 
acquirer, ‘Deal_Val’ is the M&A deal value measured in millions of US $, ‘Hostile’ equals 1 when the deal is hostile and 0 otherwise, 
‘Ind_Relat.’ equals 1 when the target and acquirer operate in the same industry and 0 otherwise, ‘All_Cash’ equals 1 when the method of 
payment is all cash and 0 otherwise, ‘MV_BVAcq’ is the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer, ‘TD_TAAcq’ is the ratio of total debt to total assets, 
‘LiquidAcq’ is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, ‘TurnovAcq’ is the trading volume divided by total outstanding shares three 
months before the announcement of the deal, ‘Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar’ is the difference between the acquirer and target countries’ anti-self-
dealing index values, ‘Rel_Maturity’ is the difference between acquirer and target M&A maturity, and ‘Prior_JV_or_Alliance’ the natural 
logarithm of the number of joint ventures or strategic alliances that the acquirer completed in the target region before the current deal. We 
estimate our regressions with fixed effect panel specification, where the unique investor name represents the cluster variable in the panel. For our 
main regression specification, where we use the acquirer BHAR returns over the 12-month period post-M&A performance adjusted by the MSCI 
World Size Index, the underlying deal data sample is 748 deals. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are not estimated on the basis 
of a random sample or that the distributions of our independent variables and regression residual are not independent or identically distributed 
(i.i.d.), all models have a robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each 
independent variable. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
  
 (1) (2) 
Institutional investor expertise 
Knl_II 0.010** 0.010** 
 2.360 2.380 
KnI_II x Rel_Maturity 0.678*** 0.696*** 
 7.040 7.200 
Prior_JV_or_Alliance  x Rel_Maturity  -0.007 
  -1.120 
Control variables 
Cult_Dist -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 -8.810 -8.530 
Prct_Held_B -0.236*** -0.236*** 
 -2.610 -2.610 
Deal_Val -0.024*** -0.024*** 
 -24.660 -24.000 
Hostile -0.028*** -0.029*** 
 -3.410 -3.470 
Ind_Relat. 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 19.310 19.320 
All_Cash 0.059*** 0.059*** 
 32.860 32.860 
MV_BVAcq Y-1 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 -69.170 -69.270 
TD_TAAcq Y-1 -0.014** -0.012* 
 -2.070 -1.650 
LiquidAcq Y-1 -0.296*** -0.294*** 
 -29.300 -27.630 
TurnovAcq -0.088*** -0.089*** 
 -9.200 -9.140 
Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar 0.079*** 0.078*** 
 21.060 21.060 
Rel_Maturity 0.079*** 0.083*** 
 4.830 4.790 
Prior_JV_or_Alliance 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 91.180 90.360 
Constant 1.442*** 1.440*** 
 126.860 123.260 
Unique institutional investors 4,078 4,078 
Cross-border M&A deals 748 748 
Number of observations 75,555 75,555 
Wald Chi2 30581.50 32166.97 
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Table 9: Analysis of
 t-1m to t+12m post-M&A performance (Alternative measures of the discrepancy in M&A environments) 
The dependent variable is the acquirer BHAR returns over the -1 to +12 months period adjusted by the MSCI World Size Index corresponding to 
each acquirer company. ‘KnI_II’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer 
share register, ‘KnI_II x Rel_Maturity’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the 
acquirer share register multiplied by the difference in M&A maturity between the target and acquirer countries, ‘KnI_II x Geog_Dist’ is 
knowledge-intensive institutional investors multiplied by the natural logarithm of the geographic distance between the acquirer and target 
regions, ‘Cult_Dist’ is the cultural distance between the acquirer and target countries, ‘Prct_Held_B’ is the percentage of outstanding shares 
which each institutional investor has in the acquirer, ‘Deal_Val’ is the M&A deal value measured in millions of US $, ‘Hostile’ equals 1 when 
the deal is hostile and 0 otherwise, ‘Ind_Relat.’ equals 1 when the target and acquirer operate in the same industry and 0 otherwise, ‘All_Cash’ 
equals 1 when the method of payment is all cash and 0 otherwise, ‘MV_BVAcq’ is the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer, ‘TD_TAAcq’ is the 
ratio of total debt to total assets, ‘LiquidAcq’ is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, ‘TurnovAcq’ is the trading volume divided by 
total outstanding shares three months before the announcement of the deal, ‘Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar’ is the difference between the acquirer and 
target countries’ anti-self-dealing index values, ‘Rel_Maturity’ is the difference between acquirer and target M&A maturity, and ‘Geog_Dist’ is 
the natural logarithm of the geographic distance between the acquirer and target regions. We estimate our regressions with fixed effect panel 
specification, where the unique investor name represents the cluster variable in the panel. For our main regression specification, where we use 
the acquirer BHAR returns over the 12-month period post-M&A performance adjusted by the MSCI World Size Index, the underlying deal data 
sample is 748 deals. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are not estimated on the basis of a random sample or that the distributions 
of our independent variables and regression residual are not independent or identically distributed (i.i.d.), all models have a robust estimate of 
variance following Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each independent variable. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
Institutional investor expertise 
Knl_II 0.018 0.004 
 0.730 0.180 
KnI_II x Rel_Maturity  0.356*** 
  3.730 
KnI_II x Geog_Dist -0.003 -0.001 
 -0.850 -0.420 
Control variables   
Cult_Dist 0.000 -0.001 
 0.330 -1.200 
Prct_Held_B -0.078 -0.073 
 -0.950 -0.890 
Deal_Val -0.029*** -0.027*** 
 -31.090 -30.010 
Hostile -0.023*** -0.028*** 
 -2.570 -3.100 
Ind_Relat. 0.040*** 0.036*** 
 18.870 17.160 
All_Cash 0.065*** 0.064*** 
 36.210 34.710 
MV_BVAcq Y-1 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 -72.670 -72.710 
TD_TAAcq Y-1 0.008 0.007 
 1.150 1.040 
LiquidAcq Y-1 -0.267*** -0.269*** 
 -26.460 -26.390 
TurnovAcq -0.110*** -0.154*** 
 -11.880 -16.080 
Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar 0.081*** 0.076*** 
 22.670 20.480 
Rel_Maturity  0.025 
  1.490 
Geog_Dist -0.027*** -0.028*** 
 -18.140 -18.030 
Constant 1.486*** 1.491*** 
 96.930 96.980 
Unique institutional investors 4,078 4,078 
Cross-border M&A deals 748 748 
Number of observations 75,555 75,555 
Wald Chi2 10757.89 11330.51 
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Table 10: Analysis of
 t-1m to t+12m and t-1m to t+36m post-M&A performance (Alternative measures of M&A success) 
The dependent variable is the acquirer BHAR returns over the -1 to +12 months and -1 to +36 months period adjusted by the MSCI Regional or 
Regional & Size indices of the acquirer. ‘KnI_II’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors 
on the acquirer share register, ‘KnI_II x Rel_Maturity’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional 
investors on the acquirer share register multiplied by the difference in M&A maturity between the target and acquirer countries, ‘Cult_Dist’ is 
the cultural distance between the acquirer and target countries, ‘Prct_Held_B’ is the percentage of outstanding shares which each institutional 
investor has in the acquirer, ‘Deal_Val’ is the M&A deal value measured in millions of US $, ‘Hostile’ equals 1 when the deal is hostile and 0 
otherwise, ‘Ind_Relat.’ equals 1 when the target and acquirer operate in the same industry and 0 otherwise, ‘All_Cash’ equals 1 when the 
method of payment is all cash and 0 otherwise, ‘MV_BVAcq’ is the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer, ‘TD_TAAcq’ is the ratio of total debt to 
total assets, ‘LiquidAcq’ is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, ‘TurnovAcq’ is the trading volume divided by total outstanding 
shares three months before the announcement of the deal, ‘Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar’ is the difference between the acquirer and target countries’ 
anti-self-dealing index values, and ‘Rel_Maturity’ is the difference between acquirer and target M&A maturity. We estimate our regressions 
with fixed effect panel specification, where the unique investor name represents the cluster variable in the panel. For our main regression 
specification, where we use the acquirer BHAR returns over the 12-month period post-M&A performance adjusted by the MSCI World Size 
Index, the underlying deal data sample is 748 deals. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are not estimated on the basis of a random 
sample or that the distributions of our independent variables and regression residual are not independent or identically distributed (i.i.d.), all 
models have a robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each independent 
variable. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
(1) MSCI Regional 
Index, 
 t-1m to t+12m 
(2) MSCI Regional & 
Size Index, 




t-1m to t+36m 
(4) MSCI 
Regional & Size 
Index, 
t-1m to t+36m 
Institutional investor expertise 
Knl_II 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.021*** 
 9.040 10.450 7.620 4.370 
KnI_II x Rel_Maturity 1.068*** 1.052*** 1.086*** 0.671*** 
 14.050 13.720 9.300 5.950 
Control variables     
Cult_Dist 0.001 0.002*** -0.027*** -0.025*** 
 1.130 2.780 -19.480 -20.800 
Prct_Held_B 0.017 -0.053 0.023 -0.162 
 0.330 -0.980 0.210 -1.490 
Deal_Val -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.035*** -0.027*** 
 -26.450 -27.060 -35.530 -24.420 
Hostile -0.085*** -0.066*** -0.095*** -0.007 
 -16.590 -15.750 -9.680 -0.780 
Ind_Relat. 0.009*** 0.003* 0.113*** 0.092*** 
 6.030 1.700 38.890 31.660 
All_Cash 0.069*** 0.059*** 0.086*** 0.070*** 
 46.930 42.920 37.870 32.040 
MV_BVAcq Y-1 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
 -19.460 -23.540 -25.030 -14.170 
TD_TAAcq Y-1 0.017*** -0.027*** 0.059*** -0.018* 
 3.810 -6.150 5.550 -1.790 
LiquidAcq Y-1 -0.224*** -0.252*** -0.313*** -0.333*** 
 -30.560 -32.660 -24.960 -25.130 
TurnovAcq -0.081*** -0.069*** -0.240*** -0.250*** 
 -12.470 -10.790 -23.880 -24.080 
Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar 0.022*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.081*** 
 8.240 13.370 7.350 17.580 
Rel_Maturity -0.060*** -0.056*** 0.206*** 0.093*** 
 -4.680 -4.520 9.630 4.640 
Constant 1.103*** 1.109*** 1.310*** 1.263*** 
 273.880 264.010 162.160 138.130 
Unique institutional investors 4,078 4,038 3,758 3,579 
Cross-border M&A deals 748 706 697 596 
Number of observations 75,555 72,152 64,945 57,404 
Wald Chi2 6460.80 6244.76 9317.86 6225.86 
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Table 11: Analysis of
 t-1m to t+12m post-M&A performance (Alternative measures of M&A success continued) 
The dependent variable is the acquirer BHAR returns over the -1 to +12 months period adjusted by the MSCI World Size Index corresponding to 
each acquirer company. ‘KnI_II’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer 
share register, ‘KnI_II x Rel_Maturity’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the 
acquirer share register multiplied by the difference in M&A maturity between the target and acquirer countries, ‘Cult_Dist’ is the cultural 
distance between the acquirer and target countries, ‘Prct_Held_B’ is the percentage of outstanding shares which each institutional investor has in 
the acquirer, ‘Deal_Val’ is the M&A deal value measured in millions of US $, ‘Hostile’ equals 1 when the deal is hostile and 0 otherwise, 
‘Ind_Relat.’ equals 1 when the target and acquirer operate in the same industry and 0 otherwise, ‘All_Cash’ equals 1 when the method of 
payment is all cash and 0 otherwise, ‘MV_BVAcq’ is the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer, ‘TD_TAAcq’ is the ratio of total debt to total assets, 
‘LiquidAcq’ is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, ‘TurnovAcq’ is the trading volume divided by total outstanding shares three 
months before the announcement of the deal, ‘Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar’ is the difference between the acquirer and target countries’ anti-self-
dealing index values, ‘Rel_Maturity’ is the difference between acquirer and target M&A maturity, ‘Tender_Offer’ equals 1 if the deal is 
classified as a ‘tender offer’ by the SDC Platinum Database and 0 otherwise, ‘Competing_Bidder’ equals 1 if there are any competing bidders 
and 0 otherwise, and ‘Target_Term_Fee’ equals 1 if there is a target company termination fee clause in the deal agreement document and 0 
otherwise. We estimate our regressions with fixed effect panel specification, where the unique investor name represents the cluster variable in 
the panel. For our main regression specification, where we use the acquirer BHAR returns over the 12-month period post-M&A performance 
adjusted by the MSCI World Size Index, the underlying deal data sample is 748 deals. For Table 11, the underlying deal data sample for Model 
1 is 177 and for Model 2 it is 797. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are not estimated on the basis of a random sample or that the 
distributions of our independent variables and regression residual are not independent or identically distributed (i.i.d.), all models have robust 
estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each independent variable. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
(1) Dependent variable: 
impairment of goodwill 
(2) Dependent variable: 
likelihood of deal completion 
Institutional investor expertise   
Knl_II -75.545*** 0.352*** 
 -12.090 10.680 
KnI_II x Rel_Maturity -871.225*** 3.427*** 
 -5.880 4.280 
Control variables   
Cult_Dist 34.201*** 0.025*** 
 26.230 4.060 
Prct_Held_B -41.567 1.686** 
 -0.760 2.210 
Deal_Val -28.679*** -0.130*** 
 -38.310 -25.870 
Hostile 98.691*** Omitted 
 39.050  
Ind_Relat. -5.487** 0.471*** 
 -2.200 25.090 
All_Cash 60.640*** -0.088*** 
 29.460 -5.630 
MV_BVAcq Y-1 -0.263*** 0.020*** 
 -26.130 16.890 
TD_TAAcq Y-1 83.798*** -1.345*** 
 12.070 -33.520 
LiquidAcq Y-1 232.189*** -1.385*** 
 31.470 -22.570 
TurnovAcq -22.800*** 0.181*** 
 -4.400 3.670 
Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar 77.533*** -0.936*** 
 42.830 -37.300 
Rel_Maturity -759.877*** -0.268** 
 -18.750 -2.000 
Tender_Offer  -0.068*** 
  -4.290 
Competing_Bidder  -0.265*** 
  -11.480 
Target_Term_Fee  -0.008 
  -0.410 
Constant 94.262*** 2.769*** 
 27.170 68.460 
Unique institutional investors 3,154 4,832 
Cross-border M&A deals 174 797 
Number of observations 43,256 81,315 
Wald Chi2 4952.87 4867.45 
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Table 12: Analysis of
 t-1m to t+12m post-M&A performance (Deal level, serial acquirers and primary index-listing sensitivity analysis) 
  
 
(1) Large sample, original 
model,  Institutional Investor 
level 
(2) Large sample all controls,  
Institutional Investor level 
(3)  Large sample all controls 
excl. serial acquirers,  
Institutional Investor level 
Institutional investor expertise    
Knl_II 0.006* -0.001 0.001 
 1.650 -0.250 0.140 
KnI_II x Rel_Maturity 0.434*** 0.529*** 2.042*** 
 8.260 4.520 9.320 
Control variables    
Cult_Dist 0.000 -0.016*** 0.025*** 
 0.160 -15.430 11.930 
Prct_Held_B -0.088 -0.208*** -0.255*** 
 -1.510 -3.530 -3.120 
Deal_Val -0.010*** -0.004*** -0.010*** 
 -16.870 -4.010 -6.070 
Hostile -0.072*** -0.005 0.044*** 
 -14.260 -1.350 4.020 
Ind_Relat. 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.053*** 
 14.730 12.870 9.770 
All_Cash 0.031*** 0.014*** 0.032*** 
 17.360 6.260 6.230 
MV_BVAcq Y-1 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 10.000 -3.180 -1.020 
TD_TAAcq Y-1 -0.122*** -0.042*** -0.215*** 
 -16.510 -3.490 -10.710 
LiquidAcq Y-1 -0.204*** -0.214*** -0.029 
 -25.800 -17.650 -1.240 
TurnovAcq -0.139*** -0.016 -0.056*** 
 -18.260 -1.480 -2.980 
Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar 0.053*** -0.020*** 0.039*** 
 16.190 -4.560 4.980 
Rel_Maturity -0.230*** 0.889*** -0.315*** 
 -14.680 11.620 -3.090 
Domic_Tar_Reg 
 0.006** 0.029*** 
  2.020 4.740 
Top_Advis 
 -0.026*** 0.028*** 
  -8.880 5.160 
Prior_Sub 
 -0.045*** 0.049*** 
  -11.590 7.170 
Prior_Exp 
 0.000*** 0.003*** 
  -3.040 20.010 
Prior_JV_or_Alliance 
 0.016*** -0.022*** 
  9.980 -5.050 
Prior_JV_or_Alliance x  Rel_Maturity 
 -0.046*** 0.118*** 
  -3.030 3.220 
Any_II_Leave 
 -0.026*** -0.032*** 
  -5.890 -4.700 
Geog_Dist 
 0.004** 0.019*** 
  2.540 6.380 
KnI_II x Geog_Dist 
 -0.070*** 0.081*** 
  -6.610 4.860 
Acquisitive_CrossBorder_Mean 
 -0.016*** Omitted 
  -4.680  
Constant 1.134*** 1.125*** 0.824*** 
 226.840 83.010 28.070 
Unique institutional investors 4,085 4,085 2,541 
Cross-border M&A deals 2,065 2,065 531 
Number of observations 123,585 123,585 24,693 
Wald Chi2 1690 2702 2401.21 
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Table 12 continued 
The dependent variable is the acquirer BHAR returns over the -1 to +12 months period adjusted by the MSCI World Size Index corresponding to 
each acquirer company. ‘KnI_II’ is knowledge-intensive institutional investors, ‘KnI_II’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the 
knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer share register, ‘KnI_II x Rel_Maturity’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region 
of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer share register multiplied by the difference in M&A maturity between the target 
and acquirer countries, ‘Cult_Dist’ is the cultural distance between the acquirer and target countries, ‘Prct_Held_B’ is the percentage of 
outstanding shares which each institutional investor has in the acquirer, ‘Deal_Val’ is the M&A deal value measured in millions of US $, 
‘Hostile’ equals 1 when the deal is hostile and 0 otherwise, ‘Ind_Relat.’ equals 1 when the target and acquirer operate in the same industry and 0 
otherwise, ‘All_Cash’ equals 1 when the method of payment is all cash and 0 otherwise, ‘MV_BVAcq’ is the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer, 
‘TD_TAAcq’ is the ratio of total debt to total assets, ‘LiquidAcq’ is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, ‘TurnovAcq’ is the trading 
volume divided by total outstanding shares three months before the announcement of the deal, ‘Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar’ is the difference 
between the acquirer and target countries’ anti-self-dealing index values, ‘Rel_Maturity’ is the difference between acquirer and target M&A 
maturity, ‘Domic_Tar_Reg’ equals 1 when the institutional investor on the acquirer’s share register is domiciled in the target region, ‘Prior_Exp’ 
equals 1 when the acquirer completed an earlier deal in the target region, ‘Top_Advis’ equals 1 when the acquirer is advised by a global 
investment bank, ‘Prior_Sub’ equals 1 when the acquirer has a subsidiary in the target region, ‘Any_II_Leave’ is the number of institutional 
investors that dispose of their holdings in the acquirer company within six months of the M&A deal announcement, ‘Geog_Dist’ is the natural 
logarithm of the geographic distance between the acquirer and target regions, ‘KnI_II x Geog_Dist’ is knowledge-intensive institutional 
investors multiplied by the natural logarithm of the geographic distance between the acquirer and target regions, ‘Prior_JV_or_Alliance’ is the 
natural logarithm of the number of joint ventures or strategic alliances that the acquirer completed in the target region before the current deal, 
‘KnI_II x Prior_JV_or_Alliance’ is knowledge-intensive institutional investors multiplied by the natural logarithm of the number of joint 
ventures or strategic alliances that the acquirer completed in the target region before the current deal, ‘Acquisitive_CrossBorder_Mean’ equals 1 
when the acquirer has completed a number of international deals which is greater than the average number of international deals completed by 
all firms within the last year and 0 otherwise. We estimate our regressions with fixed effect panel specification, where the unique investor name 
represents the cluster variable in the panel. For our main regression specification, where we use the acquirer BHAR returns over the 12-month 
period post-M&A performance adjusted by the MSCI World Size Index, the underlying deal data sample is 748 deals. For Table 13, the 
underlying deal data sample for Model 1 and 2 is 2,065 and for Model 3 it is 531. Note that the number of additional new unique institutional 
investors for the large sample is small in relation to how many new deals are added to the sample. All added deals refer to deals completed by 
acquirers which are not part of the constitute of the primary index. When one looks at all the extra deals completed by smaller acquirers or 
acquirers listed on the secondary exchanges, the number of new unique institutional investors that are now present, but were not present on deals 
only on the primary index-listed acquirers’ share register is small. This is not surprising as few institutional investors specialize only in smaller 
companies or companies listed on the secondary exchanges. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are not estimated on the basis of a 
random sample or that the distributions of our independent variables and regression residual are not independent or identically distributed (i.i.d.), 
all models have a robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each independent 
variable. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 13: Analysis of
 t-1m to t+12m post-M&A performance (Deal level, serial acquirers and primary index-listing sensitivity analysis 
continued) 
 
(1) Original sample, 
original model, deal level 
(2) Original sample, all 
controls, deal level 
(3) Original sample, all 
controls, excl. serial 
acquirers, deal level 
Institutional investor expertise 
Knl_II 0.046** 0.116** 0.083 
 2.140 2.250 0.810 
KnI_II x Rel_Maturity 0.289** 1.983*** 4.519*** 
 2.390 3.680 3.980 
Control variables        
Cult_Dist -0.009 -0.030* 0.016 
 -0.780 -1.950 0.550 
Deal_Val -0.007 0.009 0.004 
 -0.760 0.660 0.120 
Hostile 0.136 -0.010 -0.001 
 0.820 -0.130 -0.010 
Ind_Relat. 0.061** 0.015 -0.024 
 2.270 0.390 -0.280 
All_Cash 0.038 0.011 -0.036 
 1.450 0.300 -0.420 
MV_BVAcq Y-1 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** 
 -3.070 -3.880 -2.250 
TD_TAAcq Y-1 0.060 0.169 0.110 
 0.740 1.240 0.360 
LiquidAcq Y-1 -0.236* -0.036 0.309 
 -1.830 -0.210 0.950 
TurnovAcq -0.030 0.080 0.087 
 -0.190 0.320 0.180 
Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar 0.057 0.011 0.027 
 1.220 0.200 0.230 
Rel_Maturity -0.583* -0.342 -0.402 
 -1.850 -0.910 -0.520 
Any_II_Leave -0.055* -0.120*** -0.096 
















  -0.640 -1.860 
Prior_JV_or_Alliance x  Rel_Maturity 
 
0.048 -1.041* 
  0.300 -1.870 
Geog_Dist 
 0.030* 0.063* 
  1.770 1.840 
KnI_II x Geog_Dist 
 0.000*** 0.000*** 




  -0.720  
Constant 1.124*** 0.789*** 0.437 
 14.880 4.510 1.180 
Number of observations / Cross-border M&A deals 748 748 91 
R2 0.0465 0.1425 0.3068 
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Table 13 continued 
The dependent variable is the acquirer BHAR returns over the -1 to +12 months period adjusted by the MSCI World Size Index corresponding to 
each acquirer company. ‘KnI_II’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer 
share register, ‘KnI_II x Rel_Maturity’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the 
acquirer share register multiplied by the difference in M&A maturity between the target and acquirer countries, ‘Cult_Dist’ is the cultural 
distance between the acquirer and target countries, ‘Prct_Held_B’ is the percentage of outstanding shares which each institutional investor has in 
the acquirer, ‘Deal_Val’ is the M&A deal value measured in millions of US $, ‘Hostile’ equals 1 when the deal is hostile and 0 otherwise, 
‘Ind_Relat.’ equals 1 when the target and acquirer operate in the same industry and 0 otherwise, ‘All_Cash’ equals 1 when the method of 
payment is all cash and 0 otherwise, ‘MV_BVAcq’ is the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer, ‘TD_TAAcq’ is the ratio of total debt to total assets, 
‘LiquidAcq’ is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, ‘TurnovAcq’ is the trading volume divided by total outstanding shares three 
months before the announcement of the deal, ‘Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar’ is the difference between the acquirer and target countries’ anti-self-
dealing index values, ‘Rel_Maturity’ is the difference between acquirer and target M&A maturity, ‘Domic_Tar_Reg’ equals 1 when the 
institutional investor on the acquirer’s share register is domiciled in the target region, ‘Prior_Exp’ equals 1 when the acquirer completed an 
earlier deal in the target region, ‘Top_Advis’ equals 1 when the acquirer is advised by a global Investment Bank, ‘Prior_Sub’ equals 1 when the 
acquirer has a subsidiary in the target region, ‘Any_II_Leave’ is the number of institutional investors that dispose of their holdings in the 
acquirer company within six months of the M&A deal announcement, ‘Geog_Dist’ is the natural logarithm of the geographic distance between 
the acquirer and target regions, ‘KnI_II x Geog_Dist’ is knowledge-intensive institutional investors multiplied by the natural logarithm of the 
geographic distance between the acquirer and target regions, ‘Prior_JV_or_Alliance’ is the natural logarithm of the number of joint ventures or 
strategic alliances that the acquirer completed in the target region before the current deal, ‘KnI_II x Prior_JV_or_Alliance’ is knowledge-
intensive institutional investors multiplied by the natural logarithm of the number of joint ventures or strategic alliances that the acquirer 
completed in the target region before the current deal, ‘Acquisitive_CrossBorder_Mean’ equals 1 when the acquirer has completed a number of 
international deals which is greater than the average number of international deals completed by all firms within the last year and 0 otherwise. 
We estimate our regressions with fixed effect panel specification, where the unique investor name represents the cluster variable in the panel. 
For our main regression specification, where we use the acquirer BHAR returns over the 12-month period post-M&A performance adjusted by 
the MSCI World Size Index, the underlying deal data sample is 748 deals. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are not estimated on 
the basis of a random sample or that the distributions of our independent variables and regression residual are not independent or identically 
distributed (i.i.d.), all models have a robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below 
each independent variable. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
